I H S — Reinhard Slepcevic / Scholar — 97
Research Interests
Current Research Interest
EU's environmental policy, diffuse interests, litigation, preliminary reference procedure, interest groups
Dissertation Outline:
Title: EU-Level Litigation: New Opportunities for Collective Action of Diffuse Interests?
(September 2005)
Puzzle and Research Question
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has been seen as a crucial driving force in European Integration. Litigation across the European multi-level system has been used by societal actors to promote their interests by activating “forgotten” rights stemming from European law.
Nonetheless, there are still important blind spots in political science research on EU-related adjudication effects. This dissertation seeks to shed light on one of these black holes, namely the strategic use of European law by groups representing diffuse interests.
The preliminary reference system (Art. 234 TEC) gives societal actors a powerful instrument to promote their interests. Based on the doctrines of supremacy and direct effect, the ECJ can declare that a national provision is not to be applied if it violates European law.
Therefore, societal actors can strategically use EU-level litigation in order to promote their interests on the national level. This is precisely what happened in economic areas like the free movement of goods, where intense financial interests were involved. Yet, more diffuse interests were also promoted by interest groups through the preliminary reference system. In the UK, for example, women’s groups effectively influenced national gender equality policy by using EU-level litigation.
However, it is puzzling why European environmental groups have used this interest promoting instrument to such a relatively little extent. Even though there are numerous provisions in European environmental law on which these groups could draw, they have so far only initiated 12 preliminary references. Moreover, there is a surprising variance across Member states in the use of EU-level litigation. Whereas Italian groups used this instrument four times, groups from Germany or the UK did so only once.
The aim of this research project is to solve this puzzle. The central research questions are therefore:
Why do environmental groups use EU-level litigation only to such a relatively little extent?
What are the reasons explaining the variation in the use of EU-level litigation by environmental groups across Member states?
I H S — Reinhard Slepcevic / Scholar — 99
Theory and Hypothesis
My theoretical framework is based on Fritz Scharpf’s actor-centred institutionalism.
According to it, the characteristics of a Member state’s political and legal system facilitate or impede the use of EU level litigation for groups representing diffuse interests. Starting with rational assumptions about actor’s behaviour, interest groups will use this instrument if certain conditions are fulfilled. These conditions are reflected by a Member state’s political and legal opportunity structure. Its political opportunity structure refers to factors like the predominant mode of decision-making, the degree of organisation of diffuse interests or the litigiousness of a society. The legal opportunity structure reflects the possibilities for interest groups to use EU law before national courts. This can be facilitated by the availability of legal aid and expertise or the locus standi for groups, but also by the acceptance of EU law by the national judiciary. Following this framework, the main research hypothesis is: the better a Member state’s political and legal opportunity structure for EU-level litigation, the more groups representing diffuse interests will use the preliminary reference system to promote their policy objectives.
Method
The methodological approach of this research project is a combination of a comparative method, based on a small-n, most-similar system and no-variance design, and a qualitative mode of inquiry founded on semi-structured elite interviews.
Firstly, a comparative method based on a small-n has been chosen in order to allow for the detailed analyses of the cases. This “thick description” is important given that little research exists dealing with the litigation behaviour of environmental groups. The goal is to reach analytical generalizations, which demands the careful selection of the cases. Therefore, secondly, a most-similar system design has been chosen. The countries will be selected intentionally on their independent variables, i.e. the characteristics of their political and legal opportunity structure. Thirdly, the main dependent variable of this research project, i.e. “little use of EU-level litigation by environmental groups” remains more or less constant across the Member states, which leads therefore to a no-variance design. Although this kind of research design was heavily criticized by some scholars in the beginning of the 1990s, recent work on methodological issues give convincing justifications for it.
Secondly, a qualitative mode of inquiry based on semi-structured expert interviews has been chosen because not only the use, but especially the non-use of EU-level litigation by interest groups is to be explained. Given the fact that there is only very little literature trying to explain this non-use, it is crucial to allow for as much openness as possible in the research process to reveal the relevant independent variables. This could not be achieved by a standardized, quantitative survey. Moreover, following the framework of actor-centred institutionalism, if the interest groups’ behaviour can not be explained by rational assumptions, more sociological explanations need to be considered. Again, a qualitative
approach is better able to show whether rational choice calculations explain groups’ decision to use, but especially to not use EU-level litigation, or a “logic of appropriateness”.
Previous Research
The Social Dialogue in the legislative process of the EU: a new form of corporatism at European level?
Abstract
When the Treaty of Maastricht granted three European interest groups privileged and exclusive access to the decision-making process in the field of EU social policy, it was seen as a fundamental change in European labour law, which could lead to some sort of corporatism at the European level. Ten years later, does this prediction still hold?
To answer this question a detailed look is taken at the actors involved, the interests they are pursuing and the existing results of the so-called social partner procedure. It is argued that although some similarities can be found when compared to national forms of corporatism, several structural obstacles made, and still make, corporatism in the field of EU social policy very unlikely. Other approaches of interest intermediation, like pluralism or policy networks, are also not able to capture this procedure as they focus mainly on structural characteristics.
I hold the view that a dynamic, process-orientated policy network approach is needed to cover the specific features of the social partner procedure.
I H S — Erik Tajalli / Scholar — 101