China‘s Banking Sector
Old Problems Overcome – New Problems Ahead
Conference on European Economic Integration (CEEI) 2011
“European Integration in a Global Economic Setting – China, Russia and CESEE”
Vienna, 22 November 2011 Markus Taube
Storyline
I. State of the Chinese Economy II. Banking Sector Development
III. Risk Assessment: The Real Estate „Bubble“
IV. Shadow Banking V. The Way Ahead
Storyline
I. State of the Chinese Economy
II. Banking Sector Development
III. Risk Assessment: The Real Estate „Bubble“
IV. Shadow Banking V. The Way Ahead
Slowing but still strong growth
Contribution to GDP growth
%, annual average
10,610,1
9,0
6,8 6,2 7,9
9,1 10,7
11,5 10,3
9,2
9,8 9,7 9,5 9,1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14
1. Q 2008
2. Q 2008
3. Q 2008
4. Q 2008
1. Q 2009
2. Q 2009
3. Q 2009
4. Q 2009
1. Q 2010
2. Q 2010
3. Q 2010
4. Q 2010
1. Q 2011
2. Q 2011
3. Q 2011
GDP growth
%, quarterly, yoy
NBS 2011, IMF 2011
Private investors are back
Fixed Asset Investment, yoy growth
IMF 2011
Strong exports and increasingly dynamic import activity
Trade Development, monthly, US$ billion
IMF 2011
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
01.01.2007 01.04.2007 01.07.2007 01.10.2007 01.01.2008 01.04.2008 01.07.2008 01.10.2008 01.01.2009 01.04.2009 01.07.2009 01.10.2009 01.01.2010 01.04.2010 01.07.2010 01.10.2010 01.01.2011 01.04.2011 01.07.2011 01.10.2011
Overall CPI y-o-y Urban CPI y-o-y Rural CPI y-o-y
Inflation is coming down
NBS 2011 CCB Int‘l 2011
Money supply and formal sector loans back to normal
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
01.01.2007 01.04.2007 01.07.2007 01.10.2007 01.01.2008 01.04.2008 01.07.2008 01.10.2008 01.01.2009 01.04.2009 01.07.2009 01.10.2009 01.01.2010 01.04.2010 01.07.2010 01.10.2010 01.01.2011 01.04.2011 01.07.2011 01.10.2011
M2, yoy
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
0 10000 20000 30000 40000 50000 60000
01.01.2007 01.04.2007 01.07.2007 01.10.2007 01.01.2008 01.04.2008 01.07.2008 01.10.2008 01.01.2009 01.04.2009 01.07.2009 01.10.2009 01.01.2010 01.04.2010 01.07.2010 01.10.2010 01.01.2011 01.04.2011 01.07.2011 01.10.2011
Mrd. Yuan
Total loans Change y-o-y
RMB loans
of financial institutions
CBRC 2011 Bloomberg 2011
Storyline
I. State of the Chinese Economy II. Banking Sector Development
III. Risk Assessment: The Real Estate „Bubble“
IV. Shadow Banking V. The Way Ahead
China‘s banking system
Increasing diversity,
but still dominated by the big-4
IMF 2011
The ‘old’ problems are gone
The problem of NPLs appears to have been overcome
– and it remains an SOCB issue.
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
01.03.2004 01.06.2004 01.09.2004 01.12.2004 01.03.2005 01.06.2005 01.09.2005 01.12.2005 01.03.2006 01.06.2006 01.09.2006 01.12.2006 01.03.2007 01.06.2007 01.09.2007 01.12.2007 01.03.2008 01.06.2008 01.09.2008 01.12.2008 01.03.2009 01.06.2009 01.09.2009 01.12.2009 01.03.2010 01.06.2010 01.09.2010 01.12.2010 01.03.2011 01.06.2011
NPL ratio in %
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500
01.03.2004 01.06.2004 01.09.2004 01.12.2004 01.03.2005 01.06.2005 01.09.2005 01.12.2005 01.03.2006 01.06.2006 01.09.2006 01.12.2006 01.03.2007 01.06.2007 01.09.2007 01.12.2007 01.03.2008 01.06.2008 01.09.2008 01.12.2008 01.03.2009 01.06.2009 01.09.2009 01.12.2009 01.03.2010 01.06.2010 01.09.2010 01.12.2010 01.03.2011 01.06.2011
Mrd. Yuan
Total NPL (right) Share of SOCBs (left)
Total NPL and share of SOCB
(left) (right)
CBRC 2011 Bloomberg 2011
Substantially strengthend, impressive crisis resistance
Thanks to the substantial decline of their NPL burden as well as strengthend equity capital positions all banks would withstand a NPL-quadrupling crisis upholding capital adequacy ratios of more than the required 8%.
IMF 2011
Post-crisis tightened monetary policy
With inflation coming down and GDP growth slowing down China‘s monetary policy may have reached a turning point allowing for a loosening of policies in the next months
– liquidity spillovers in the informal sector are to be prevented CBRC 2011 IMF 2011
Storyline
I. State of the Chinese Economy II. Banking Sector Development
III. Risk Assessment: The Real Estate „Bubble“
IV. Shadow Banking V. The Way Ahead
A bubble?
Residential housing
100 = Dec 2006, sa
Housing affordability
Price-to-income ratio
IMF 2011
Local bubbles
Property Prices
1000 Y RMB,/s.qm., sa, 3mma
Commercial Real Estate
1000 Y RMB,/s.qm.
IMF 2011
Banking sector exposure
Real Estate Lending
quarterly
IMF 2011
Mortgage Loans
yearly
Hovering on a high plateau ,
formal sector (!) real estate lending has recently leveled off.
Informal inflows in the sector are understood to have remained high.
Fighting fire with fire – and more …
Social housing in the 12th 5YP:
Construction respectively renovation of 35 million housing units Provision of social housing for 20% of urban population from 7%
end of 2010
35% of all housing construction starts in 2011 based on government housing initiatives
Additional measures:
− Increased downpayment-requirements for mortgage loans
− Higher interest rates (in general and depending on type of investment)
− Restrictive authorization procedures for purchase of 2ndand 3rd apartments
− Restrictive authorization of purchase requests by non-locals
− Real estate tax (pilot project in Shanghai und Chongqing)
− Charging of business tax for real estate resold during first 5 years after purchase
− Binding commitment of local governments to enforce price targets
(maximum price increases per year coupled to disposable income development)
Storyline
I. State of the Chinese Economy II. Banking Sector Development
III. Risk Assessment: The Real Estate „Bubble“
IV. Shadow Banking V. The Way Ahead
Global Financial
System
Transaction- based
Chinese Informal
Lending Channels Chinese Formal
Financial System
Transaction- based
Additional dimension of financial interaction – May serve as back-up in case of formal dis-intermediation (liquidity crunch)
Better equipped to serve the specific finance requirements of the Chinese
‚start-up economy‘ (!?)
More than there seems to be
Negative real interest on savings accounts
1-year household savings deposit rate
0,0 0,5 1,0 1,5 2,0 2,5 3,0 3,5 4,0 4,5
18.08.2006 18.11.2006 18.02.2007 18.05.2007 18.08.2007 18.11.2007 18.02.2008 18.05.2008 18.08.2008 18.11.2008 18.02.2009 18.05.2009 18.08.2009 18.11.2009 18.02.2010 18.05.2010 18.08.2010 18.11.2010 18.02.2011
-4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
01.01.2007 01.04.2007 01.07.2007 01.10.2007 01.01.2008 01.04.2008 01.07.2008 01.10.2008 01.01.2009 01.04.2009 01.07.2009 01.10.2009 01.01.2010 01.04.2010 01.07.2010 01.10.2010 01.01.2011 01.04.2011 01.07.2011 01.10.2011
CPI – overall
Negative real interest rates
on savings accounts in the formal sector continue to drive savers into the
(informal) shadow banking sector, draining the formal financial system of resources
The ‘formal‘ shadow banking sector
Trillion Y RMB
PBOC 2011 China Economic Watch 2011
*
*
“Social Finance”-Concept of NBS, * No shadow banking
The informal dimension of Chinese banking
hard information soft information
third party enforcement
‘Transaction-based lending’.
Standard object of analysis in the law, finance & growth literature.
Standardized information regime combined with highly formalized universalistic legal system.
History (reputation) plays is – in principle – of no importance.
‘Relationship lending’ of the law, finance
& growth literature. The evaluation of potential financial transactions is primarily based on information gathered by informal institutional arrangements
(-> History rules!). Ensuing financial transaction are embedded in formal justiciable contractual relations.
second party enforcement
Requires close relationship between transaction partners in order to facilitate property rights enforcement inside a social network and without recourse to an external ‘umpire’. Given this close relationship hard information can be expected to be systemically less important than soft information for most financial transactions.
-> Low empirical value: hostage giving, pawnbroker
Obstacles to co-operation like adverse selection and ex-post opportunism, i.e.
property rights enforcement, are solved by informal mechanisms, first of all social networks based on particu- laristic ordering regimes. Information required to make financing decisions is gathered in non-standardized form in the context of the underlying social network by means of frequent and multiplex interaction.
-> History rules!
Specific forms of China’s ‘shadow banking sector’
‘Formal’ Shadow Banking
− Off-balance-sheet lending
− Special Purpose Vehicle lending
− Direct company-to-company lending
− Trust companies / Wealth management organizations
− Leasing companies
− Regulated pawnshops
− Loan guarantee companies
− Small loan companies / microfinance organizations
− Offshore borrowing
− Private equity organizations
‘Informal’ Financial Intermediation
− Underground banks
− Private money houses
− Associations for mutual assistance
− Rotating savings and credit corporations (ROSCA)
− Private peer-to-peer lending
− Unregulated pawnshops
− Unauthorized offshore borrowing
Total volume of ‘formal’ plus ‘informal’
shadow banking unknown,
but probably in the range of a minimum 20 trillion annual flow.
Storyline
I. State of the Chinese Economy II. Banking Sector Development
III. Risk Assessment: The Real Estate „Bubble“
IV. Shadow Banking V. The Way Ahead
Three major issues to look at
Property bubble
Are government policies adequate and can they be fast enough to deflate local bubbles
Political economy
Can the reform momentum be upheld in the run up to China’s leadership change in 2012/13 Shadow banking
Government must separately address two types of shadow banking
University of Duisburg-Essen Mercator School of Management
IN-EAST, Institute for East Asian Studies Chair for the East Asian Economy / China Prof. Dr. Markus Taube